Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series)
Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device.
You can download and read online Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series) file PDF Book only if you are registered here.
And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series) book.
Happy reading Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series) Bookeveryone.
Download file Free Book PDF Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series) at Complete PDF Library.
This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats.
Here is The CompletePDF Book Library.
It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Zen: The Quantum Leap from Mind to No-Mind (Zen Discourse Series) Pocket Guide.
Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli that arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move his or her body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain what he or she wants.
- Leave a Reply.;
- Membership is Free.
- Handbook on health inequality monitoring : with a special focus on low- and middle-income countries.
- Customers who bought this product also purchased:.
- Excel 2007 Workbook For Dummies.
The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. A related problem is how someone's propositional attitudes e. Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter or body. It begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non- physical.
In Western Philosophy , the earliest discussions of dualist ideas are in the writings of Plato who maintained that humans' "intelligence" a faculty of the mind or soul could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind—body problem in the form in which it still exists today. The most frequently used argument in favor of dualism appeals to the common-sense intuition that conscious experience is distinct from inanimate matter.
If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their self , their personality, their soul , or some other such entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible. Another important argument in favor of dualism is that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different, and perhaps irreconcilable, properties. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person.
But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the prefrontal cortex feels like. Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events " qualia " or "raw feels". There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.
- Zen The Quantum Leap ~ 11 - The Sannyas Wiki!
- Blood Brother: 33 Reasons My Brother Scott Peterson Is Guilty.
- Evaluating Water Projects: Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus Win-Win Approach!
- Elegie - Guitar.
- Sensitivity of Functionals with Applications to Engineering Sciences: Proceedings of a Special Session of the American Mathematical Society Spring Meeting held in New York City May 1983.
- Browse more videos!
David Chalmers explains this argument by stating that we could conceivably know all the objective information about something, such as the brain states and wavelengths of light involved with seeing the color red, but still not know something fundamental about the situation — what it is like to see the color red.
If consciousness the mind can exist independently of physical reality the brain , one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One possible explanation is that of a miracle, proposed by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche , where all mind—body interactions require the direct intervention of God. Another possible argument that has been proposed by C. Lewis  is the Argument from Reason : if, as monism implies, all of our thoughts are the effects of physical causes, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground.
Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this—or anything else—we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke. The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by Todd Moody, and developed by David Chalmers in his book The Conscious Mind.
The basic idea is that one can imagine one's body, and therefore conceive the existence of one's body, without any conscious states being associated with this body. Chalmers' argument is that it seems possible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe about a zombie must be true of it. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via physics , the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one.
It has been argued under physicalism that one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being or not being a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by Dennett who argues that "Zombies think they are conscious, think they have qualia, think they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' according to this lamentable tradition in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!
Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations. Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Seth has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing that has no spatial extension i. He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think.
It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties. At the same time, however, it is clear that Seth's mental states desires, beliefs, etc. Descartes' argument crucially depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this.
Freud claimed that a psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than the person himself does. Duhem has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than that person herself does, while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are.
He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument, because scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than the person herself can. Psychophysical parallelism , or simply parallelism , is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another.
Zen: The Quantum Leap From Mind to No-Mind
Instead, they run along parallel paths mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events and only seem to influence each other. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the monad , exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.
Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche as well as Islamic philosophers such as Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali that asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental events, are not really causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes whether mental or physical are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.
The Zen Doctrine of No Mind Read Online - video dailymotion
Property dualism is the view that the world is constituted of just one kind of substance — the physical kind — and there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties such as beliefs, desires and emotions inhere in some physical bodies at least, brains. How mental and physical properties relate causally depends on the variety of property dualism in question, and is not always a clear issue. Sub-varieties of property dualism include:. Dual aspect theory or dual-aspect monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance.
Thus it is a mixed position, which is monistic in some respects. In modern philosophical writings, the theory's relationship to neutral monism has become somewhat ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements and the relationships into which they enter to determine whether the group can be thought of as mental, physical, both, or neither, dual-aspect theory suggests that the mental and the physical are manifestations or aspects of some underlying substance, entity or process that is itself neither mental nor physical as normally understood.
Various formulations of dual-aspect monism also require the mental and the physical to be complementary, mutually irreducible and perhaps inseparable though distinct.
This is a philosophy of mind that regards the degrees of freedom between mental and physical well-being as not necessarily synonymous thus implying an experiential dualism between body and mind. An example of these disparate degrees of freedom is given by Allan Wallace who notes that it is "experientially apparent that one may be physically uncomfortable—for instance, while engaging in a strenuous physical workout—while mentally cheerful; conversely, one may be mentally distraught while experiencing physical comfort".
This philosophy also is a proponent of causal dualism which is defined as the dual ability for mental states and physical states to affect one another. Mental states can cause changes in physical states and vice versa. However, unlike cartesian dualism or some other systems, experiential dualism does not posit two fundamental substances in reality: mind and matter. Rather, experiential dualism is to be understood as a conceptual framework that gives credence to the qualitative difference between the experience of mental and physical states. Experiential dualism is accepted as the conceptual framework of Madhyamaka Buddhism.
Madhayamaka Buddhism goes even further, finding fault with the monist view of physicalist philosophies of mind as well in that these generally posit matter and energy as the fundamental substance of reality. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the cartesian dualist view is correct, rather Madhyamaka regards as error any affirming view of a fundamental substance to reality. In denying the independent self-existence of all the phenomena that make up the world of our experience, the Madhyamaka view departs from both the substance dualism of Descartes and the substance monism—namely, physicalism—that is characteristic of modern science.
The physicalism propounded by many contemporary scientists seems to assert that the real world is composed of physical things-in-themselves, while all mental phenomena are regarded as mere appearances, devoid of any reality in and of themselves.
List of Osho Books and Discourses by Topic for Osho Books (Dragged)
Much is made of this difference between appearances and reality. Indeed, physicalism, or the idea that matter is the only fundamental substance of reality, is explicitly rejected by Buddhism. In the Madhyamaka view, mental events are no more or less real than physical events. In terms of our common-sense experience, differences of kind do exist between physical and mental phenomena. While the former commonly have mass, location, velocity, shape, size, and numerous other physical attributes, these are not generally characteristic of mental phenomena. For example, we do not commonly conceive of the feeling of affection for another person as having mass or location.